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Abstract 
Following Lee & Demetis [20] who showed how 
systems theorizing can be conducted on the basis of a 
few systems principles, in this paper, we apply these 
principles to theorize about the systemic character of 
technology and investigate the role-reversal in the 
relationship between humans and technology. By 
applying systems-theoretical requirements outlined 
by Lee & Demetis, we examine conditions for the 
systemic character of technology and, based on our 
theoretical discussion, we argue that humans can 
now be considered artifacts shaped and used by the 
(system of) technology rather than vice versa. We 
argue that the role-reversal has considerable 
implications for the field of information systems that 
has thus far focused only on the use of the IT artifact 
by humans. We illustrate these ideas with empirical 
material from a well known case from the financial 
markets: the collapse (“Flash Crash”) of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The field of Information Systems (IS) rests 
largely on examining the contextual use of 
technology within social (sub)-systems and 
organizations. In such a context, the relationship 
between the social and the technical has always been 
of special interest to IS researchers. Ultimately, this 
interest is applied to the interactions between humans 
and information technology, and at the center of 
attention, one can often find the concept of the IT 
artifact. From considering the IT artifact as an 
ensemble of hardware and software [27] to bundles 
of material and cultural properties that are 
recognizable and emerge from ongoing 
socioeconomic practices [34], or even to 
sociotechnical assemblages [38], one thing is clear: 
the concept of the IT artifact has changed 
substantially over the years. In fact, the ontological 
dimensions upon which the “IT artifact” has come to 
be considered have shifted so much that Steven 
Alter’s suggestion was to “retire” that concept 
altogether from the lexicon of IS scholarly debate as 
it has outlived its usefulness [1]. While this is not an 
essay about the concept of the IT artifact per se, we 
do make the argument that the nebulous character of 
that concept is due to a much larger (though subtle) 
phenomenon at play: the transition of technology 
from artifact to system. In fact, the contextual 
richness that has been added to the concept of the “IT 
artifact” after its first use by March and Smith [27], 
can be re-interpreted as a recognition of such a 
transition. Inspired by the post-humanist tradition that 
reflects on the boundaries between humans and 
technology, we take a different approach and develop 
a systems theoretical description of the transition 
from artifact to system. We argue that people are 
becoming agents of the (system of) technology. 
Over time, technology has penetrated society to 
such a degree that even basic functions now seem 
almost inconceivable without technology. Indeed, the 
level of dependence of society on technology has 
become so deep that – in a large number of fields – 
there are now no manual fallback plans in cases of 
technological failure. By and large, even when 
technology fails, we tend to rely on more technology 
for rectifying the problems of technological use. 
Also, the rising trend of technologized decision 
making that has taken certain fields by storm is even 
more alarming. In the foreign exchange markets for 
example, 85 percent of all trading is conducted by 
algorithms alone, i.e., without any human 
intervention; this led the scholars that investigated the 
phenomenon to call this the “Rise of the Machines” 
[10]. In the UK, the “ultra-high-speed version of 
algorithmic trading, high frequency trading, is 
estimated to account for over 77% of transactions in 
the UK market” [40, p.5].  
A skeptic of our position who might seek to argue 
against the trend of technologized decision making, 
might pose this question: Is it not the case that the 
designers of algorithms are humans? And if so, then 
couldn’t someone consider the role of algorithms 
(and of technology at large) as an extended 
application of human decisions?  
Our challenge is to convince the reader to the 
contrary. For this purpose, we render this issue 
through a few intertwined questions: How does 
technology subvert and subdue human decisions? 
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What characteristics can be identified (with the help 
of systems theorizing) for this new role that 
technology has assumed and how does this constitute 
the emergence of a system of technology? Even more 
crucially, how is it that humans become “artifacts” 
being shaped and used by technology in this – 
seemingly counterintuitive – role reversal? 
As we will see through our example of the Flash 
Crash regarding the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
the role of technology leads us to consider a 
seemingly radical idea at first – but one that we 
believe is an accurate reflection of how technology 
shapes social systems and subjects humans to forces 
that cast them out to the environment, outside of what 
has become technologized decision making; instead 
of the IT artifact being shaped and used by humans, 
humans can actually be considered as “artifacts” 
being shaped and used by machines. In this view, it is 
humans that must react to technological stimuli rather 
than technology that must react to human stimuli 
where, furthermore, the technological stimuli are 
emergent and not pre-designed (or pre-programmed) 
in any way. This also assumes that while the 
controllability of technology can be achieved at a 
micro-scale (where one could assert that the link 
between designers and – control of – artifacts is 
strict), at a macro-scale, technology exhibits 
emergent non-linear phenomena that render human 
controllability irrelevant [4, 14]. This creates a 
significant circularity wherein the systemic role of 
technology demands a higher degree of autonomy to 
be granted in the design of technological artifacts, 
where this then leads to a deeper systemic function of 
technology that leads to more demands for autonomy. 
Humans increasingly find themselves in the 
environment, outside of these dynamics.  
 
2. Examples 
 
Indeed, one can find a wealth of examples where 
technological autonomy has developed into a system 
that takes over important decisions – and humans 
find themselves outside, i.e., cast out to the 
environment, outside of these decisions. In such 
examples, human agency – “acting on behalf of 
another, or providing a particular service” [16] is 
being replaced by technologized agency. In 
categorizing the World Wide Web for instance, 
Yahoo (to bring up one example) uses proprietary 
algorithmic robots (known as bots) to create a 
searchable database that then ranks users’ search 
results based on their search queries. The structuring 
of the bot-generated entries contains the logic of how 
something will be “made searchable,” though due to 
the complexity of the task, the interaction between 
bots and websites that are indexed must be 
unsupervised. But while the millions of pre-indexed 
search results give the illusion of choice, almost 90% 
of humans don’t get past the top ten [18]. The whole 
process feels like a “search on the Internet” but it is 
actually a restricted human search of a technological 
pre-search of the Internet: the “search of a search” 
that constitutes a 2nd order phenomenon. Hence, this 
is a case of a human reacting to technological stimuli 
(i.e., an individual person reacting to the 
algorithmically generated search results intended to 
steer the person’s behavior) rather than a technology 
reacting to human stimuli (i.e, a neutral search 
algorithm providing objective results to best serve a 
human using the technology).  
Another well-known example comes from 
Amazon. The vast majority of prices are defined by 
algorithms in so far as Amazon vendors “use 
algorithmic pricing to ensure that they can 
automatically change their product prices based on a 
competitor” [39], with the result that vendors are 
being forced to engage in this practice for fear of 
losing out to the competition. Meanwhile, the 
algorithmic interactions between vendors carry the 
possibility of developing unpredictable 
consequences. Such algorithmic pricing on Amazon 
can be found in the example of the book entitled The 
Making of a Fly by evolutionary biologist Peter 
Lawrence. This book came to be priced at 
$23,698,655.93 (plus $3.99 shipping) as two sellers 
were using algorithms to adjust the price of the book 
in response to one another. It took 10 days for 
humans to notice and intervene to bring back the 
prices to normal levels [43]; ironically, “normal 
levels” merely indicated a temporary human decision 
that would allow the continuation of algorithmic 
pricing.  
Similar examples where human decisions and 
human reactions find themselves outside the 
boundary of technologized decision making can 
come from any domain. In law for instance, legal 
analysts are being replaced in complex cases by 
software that analyses thousands of legal documents; 
proprietary e-discovery algorithms of software 
companies pre-structure the defense/prosecution of a 
case by effectively pre-selecting an extremely limited 
subset of documents that will then be looked at and 
presented in court by humans [28]. By and large, it 
would be fair to say that in such cases, humans 
become the tool through which computerized 
decisions are voiced. In autonomous driving, 
Google’s self-driving car assumes full control of the 
vehicle, and while in principle, it might appear as if 
human decisions can always override the 
technologized driving process, there are no strict 
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criteria which humans could apply in such a process 
(as the decisions of the vehicle cannot but depend on 
the unpredictable circumstances that emerge in its 
environment); the self-driving car caused its first 
crash when the human user was not certain whether 
he should have intervened [13]. In news, Bloomberg 
now uses automated sentiment analysis to provide 
financial news about companies in an automated 
way; this can further assist its customers in making 
financial decisions, “without having to consume the 
content” [7]. In the job market, many of the world’s 
biggest companies use automated vetting software to 
screen CVs for particular job applications without 
even glancing at the CVs on the first round [30]. 
Even in the judiciary, the discussion on whether 
computers would be better and fairer judges has 
started since 1977 and has considered the algorithmic 
imposition of verdicts and fines [12].  
The next and third section of this essay provides a 
review of a selection of the general requirements 
proposed by Lee & Demetis [20] for systems 
theorizing, for the purpose of theorizing about 
technology itself as a system in the systems 
theoretical sense. This section also serves to pose 
reflective questions about the deep interference of 
technology in society and highlight elements that 
ought to be considered for technology in this context.  
The fourth section will present the case of the 
Flash Crash in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Index and will review the key characteristics of that 
case by considering how technology shaped the mini-
crisis through automated execution strategies.  
In the fifth – and final – section of the essay, we 
shall conclude with a brief discussion and reflect on 
the consequences of the basic systemic principles of 
technology.   
 
3. Theoretical conditions for technology 
itself as a system  
 
 In exploring a set of requirements/principles that 
systems theorizing needs to satisfy, Lee & Demetis 
[20] consider general principles that are based on the 
founders of systems theory like Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy [5], Kenneth Boulding [8], James Grier 
Miller [31] and Anatol Rapoport [36]. In their work, 
Lee & Demetis [20] extract three principles from this 
body of systems theory and add another three from 
Niklas Luhmann [25]; they maintain that systems 
theory is particularly relevant for IS research and a 
rich theory to draw from (regardless of any 
epistemological differences amongst different 
scholars). In this context, we argue that systems 
theory lends itself in exposing the subtle emergence 
of technologized interferences in the relationship 
between humans and technology and will enable 
researchers (due to its abstract/generalized lexicon) to 
render novel cases through its concepts across several 
domains of application. In Table 1 below, we list the 
six requirements as they appear in Lee & Demetis 
[20]. We give each one a code (Ri) for when we use 
the requirements in this paper though it is worth 
stressing that we don’t reflect on all six equally. Also, 
for the purposes of our discussion, we do not 
examine them in sequential order.  
 
Requirement specified in Lee & Demetis [19] Code 
The whole is more than the sum of the parts R1 
Goal Seeking 
R2 
Transformation Process (of inputs into 
outputs) R3 
Self-Reference & Autopoiesis 
R4 
System/Environment distinction 
R5 
Communication 
R6 
Table 1: Systems Requirements by Lee & Demetis [20] 
 
Our presentation of their requirements below is 
not a substitute for the original theoretical analysis – 
rather, it will be a discussion focused on targeting 
those theoretical conditions for thinking about a 
system comprised of technology. In other words, 
through different systems-theoretical principles, we 
can focus on the following question: what systems 
theoretical principles would need to be adhered to, in 
order to consider technology itself as a system?  
One of the first requirements that Lee & Demetis 
[20] stipulate in R1 is the requirement to recognize 
that if we consider any system as a whole then “the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts.” Regardless 
of whether we take technological artifacts in one 
sense (e.g. a combination of hardware/software) or 
another (e.g. sociotechnical assemblages), this 
requirement still applies. Whenever any elements 
become interrelated and interdependent, they form a 
more complex system; however: “One cannot deduce 
from complexity alone which relations among 
elements are realized” [25, p.25]. Applied to 
technology at large, this systemic requirement 
demands that whatever technological “whole” is 
identified by an observer needs to be considered as a 
system that exhibits emergent properties. These 
properties remain irreducible to the whole’s 
constituent elements.  
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Another important requirement (R5) is based upon 
the fundamental distinction between system and 
environment. As stressed by Lee & Demetis [20], this 
requirement is absolutely critical as no system can be 
perceived without an environment [3]. The 
environment should not be perceived as some type of 
residual category. Instead, “relationship to the 
environment is constitutive in system formation” [25, 
p.176]. By considering this fundamental principle 
that constitutes a pillar of systems theory and 
transcends all systems theorists [17], we can pose an 
important question: if we consider technology as a 
system then what is its environment? One response 
would be that humans (also labeled by Niklas 
Luhmann as psychic systems) are in the environment 
outside of and around a system of technology; another 
would be other technologies that would not 
interconnect directly with a specified (by an 
observer) system of technology. Another option of 
course would be a combination of the above – an 
environment wherein both humans/technology reside. 
While all possibilities can be considered, when we 
describe technology as a system in itself, we make the 
case that – via the systemic evolution of technology 
and its deep penetration in society – technology as 
system assimilates more functions within itself; in 
doing so, humans are cast out to the environment 
around the system of technology and cease to 
perform the function of decision making. The 
function of humans in the environment outside a 
system of technology becomes ever more restricted in 
merely providing inputs through which technological 
decision-making can continue uninterrupted. This is 
of course both hard to accept (for humans) and 
difficult to explore. It also implies that humans 
simply react to what is now technologized decision 
making and that, by and large, human “decisions” are 
secondary to systems-made decisions. At the very 
least, humans and what they believe their own 
decision-making to be need to adapt to the emergence 
of systemic technological phenomena. Is human 
behavior patterning itself after, or simply being 
patterned by, what the system of technology 
generates?  
One implication leading from the primacy of the 
system/environment distinction is that the distinction 
can be replicated within the system (so within any 
observed system, one can delineate further sub-
system/environment distinctions). This is another way 
of saying that the system replicates that primary 
distinction (between system/environment) within 
itself. This idea of any form (defined by Luhmann as 
the unity of a distinction) affecting itself recursively 
is distilled in the concept of re-entry. Based on 
George Spencer-Brown [41], Luhmann makes the 
following remarks: “Accordingly, the re-entry of the 
form into the form—or of the distinction into the 
distinction, or of the difference between system and 
environment into the system—should be understood 
as referring to the same thing twice. The distinction 
re-enters the distinguished. This constitutes re-entry.” 
[26, p.54]    
This type of re-entry is tightly connected with the 
concept of self-reference (R4): satisfying the systemic 
requirement for self-reference means identifying 
processes through which a system collects 
information about itself (and its own functioning), 
where this in turn can contribute to a change in its 
functioning. Through self-referential processes, 
certain systems (those that Luhmann calls 
autopoietic) continuously re-produce and maintain 
themselves. In this regard, considering technology as 
a self-referential system implies recognition of these 
dynamics that exhibit this form of re-entry; 
technology referring to technology is not a new 
phenomenon but again, in the context of 
technologized decision-making this acquires further 
significance. To the degree that technologized 
decisions become deeply embedded across different 
social systems, they elevate the complexity of the 
system of technology. This condition makes it harder 
for humans to gain visibility of the consequences of 
such systemic technologizing and, due to the 
excessive reliance of humans on technology, this 
reinforces the role-reversal between the two. The 
demand for further technologizing ends up with 
humans augmenting the systemic character of 
technology further.  
Another important systems requirement that 
follows Luhmann’s systems theory involves the 
requirement for communication (R6). For Luhmann, 
who reserves the term communication to indicate a 
broader mechanism (instead of only an act between 
human individuals), communication can be 
considered in the following triad form: 
announcement/utterance (Mitteilung), information 
(Information), and understanding (Verstehen). Also, 
in the event where human beings are participating in 
the communication process, it would follow that the 
cognitive understanding (Verstehen) that would be 
developed by the recipient might not correspond to 
the intentionality of the individual conducting the 
utterance.  
The reciprocity in communication however 
demands that whatever entity is receiving 
information following another entity’s utterance will 
react based on its own (the former’s) understanding. 
While we are typically used to be thinking about 
these processes as human-based exchanges, they can 
be easily applied at a more abstract level. In fact, one 
5750
 
 
 
5 
of the pioneering theoretical implications of 
Luhmann’s systems theory was the separation of the 
communication process from psychic systems (i.e. 
humans) and its consideration as a function of society 
[23, 25]. In a system comprised of technology (rather 
than of humans), the hardest element of the triad to 
consider is understanding; however, that does not 
have to be cognitive understanding for 
communication to be facilitated. In the case of a 
system of technology, substituting for human (or 
cognitive) understanding is technologized 
understanding; this signals the a priori acceptance or 
rejection of any information, which would then 
prompt a computational response (another utterance) 
on the basis of a pre-coded algorithmic rationality. 
This demarcates the transition from (human) 
reflective understanding to pre-organized 
understanding (that effectively collapses – or is 
reduced to – computerized decision making). Of 
course, substituting the second for the first is 
troubling. Also, human decisions are not just 
transferred across to computer decisions via the 
design of specific artifacts. The input from human 
designers is transformed (R3) into system-
technologized decisions/outputs through a complex 
nexus of technological interactions. While the goal-
seeking (R2) of specific algorithms may be perceived 
as fixed at the micro-level, at the macro-level of the 
system it becomes dynamic and uncertain. The very 
existence of unpredictable phenomena that emerge 
from such technological interactions is a testament to 
the fact that the correspondence between inputs and 
outputs in this context is non-linear. As technology 
becomes responsible for “major systemic changes 
within the global financial sector…and as algorithms 
become ever more autonomous… we need a kind of 
ethical framework for developing algorithms” [44].  
 
 
4. CASE OF THE DOW JONES INDEX 
 
First, let us clarify that it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to organize and/or deconstruct all the 
technologically-oriented incidents behind the events 
of May 6, 2010 (what has become known as the 
“Flash Crash of 2:45”). Indeed, there remain several 
conflicting aspects on these events [22, 32, 40, 44, 
46] so we will focus here only on a handful of critical 
aspects that illustrate how the demand for increasing 
computerization is framing the interactions between 
humans and machines. In this regard, we would also 
like to highlight that the complexity of this case has 
also been attributed to the multi-faceted role of 
algorithmic traders who make it almost impossible to 
deconstruct the case; this is acknowledged in several 
reports (see below).  
The purpose of this section is to reflect on the 
case of the Flash Crash and connect some of its key 
aspects to a systems-based re-conceptualization of 
technology based on the systemic principles put 
forward by Lee & Demetis [20]. This theoretical 
framing will allow us to consider the case of the Dow 
Jones index collapse as an example of technological 
domination—an example where the system of 
technology locates human artifacts in its 
environment, outside of and around the technology. 
The key sources that we will use in order to review 
the main findings of the Flash Crash include:  
i) The Report of the Staffs of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) and Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to the Joint Advisory 
Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues.  
ii) The UK report on “Crashes and high 
frequency trading” from the Government 
Office for Science (The Future of Computer 
Trading in Financial Markets – Foresight 
Driver Review – DR 7), and 
iii) An analysis for Certified Public Accountants 
when advising investors entitled 
“Understanding the ‘Flash Crash’ ” that 
summarizes the basic characteristics of the 
Flash Crash in a succinct way [6].  
 
First, in order to set the scene, it is important that 
we reflect on the turmoil behind the specific events in 
their broader context. Uncertainty in May 2010 was 
already widespread in the market due to the 
possibility of a Greek government default on 
sovereign debt [29]. Based on R5, we can think of this 
broader financial turmoil as the environmental 
stimulus to which the system of algorithmic traders 
would react. This negative market sentiment “was 
already affecting an increase in the price volatility of 
some individual securities” [9, p.1]. This set in 
motion the following key events before the 2:45pm 
Crash (in chronological order): 
1) A number of volatility pauses were triggered 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
around 1pm; individual equities began to 
increase above average levels. 
2) The S&P 500 volatility index rose by 22.5% 
by 2:30pm. In conditions of such volatility, 
investors moved their capital away from 
investments that were considered to be high-
risk and towards safer options while the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average was down by 
2.5% (due to selling pressure). 
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3) Buy-side liquidity in the “E-Mini” and the 
“SPY” (the E-mini S&P 500 futures 
contracts and the S&P 500 SPDR exchange 
traded fund) had suffered 55% and 20% 
declines respectively. 
4) Then, more critically, at about 2:32pm, a 
large fundamental trader (a mutual fund 
complex) “initiated a sell program to sell a 
total of 75,000 E-mini contracts (valued at 
approximately $4.1billion) as a hedge to an 
existing equity position” [9, p.2]. 
 
The last step in the event is viewed as one of the 
critical triggers that led to the Flash Crash. But before 
we develop that further, we need to make an 
important observation in this context. Whereas 
traders can choose how much human judgment is 
involved when executing a trade (e.g. the trader can 
choose to enter orders manually in different time 
intervals, or indeed, outsource the process to a third-
party that will manage this process by conducting 
block-trades), over the years, the interference of 
human judgment came to be perceived (by humans 
themselves) as an obstacle. For example, Lewis [21] 
remarks  that during the crash of 1987 when the US 
stock market fell sharply by 22.61%, “some Wall 
Street brokers, to avoid the orders their customers 
wanted to place to sell stocks, simply declined to pick 
up their phones … this time the authorities responded 
by changing the rules – making it easier for 
computers to do the jobs done by those imperfect 
people. The 1987 stock market crash set in motion a 
process – weak at first, stronger over the years – that 
has ended with computers entirely replacing the 
people” [21, p.3]. The need for computerization was 
paired with the inexorable need for speed; the 
intensification of these dynamics led to Wall Street’s 
“speed war.” An example of that saw the 
development of a superfast fiber-cable route between 
Chicago and New York by Daniel Spivey, just to 
shave “3 milliseconds off of the previous route of 
lowest latency” [42]. Speed matters; the fastest 
algorithm can exploit a large volume of minor 
discrepancies between markets and this is like 
“picking gold coins from the floor” [42].  
In such a context where 825 miles of fiber are laid 
down through mountains, tunnels, and rivers, in the 
straightest line possible in order to shave off 3 
milliseconds of trading, one can begin to contemplate 
how human beings are perceived (by the designers of 
algorithmic trading systems) where the average 
reaction time (for the click of a button) is 215 
milliseconds. Human beings are not just slow – they 
are (almost) redundant in such a market (though – as 
we shall see – they still serve the purpose of 
recalibrating (parts of) the technological system that 
is actually making the decisions). More recently, the 
search for more speed that would allow even faster 
versions of algorithmic trading to take place has led 
to large investments in microwave communications – 
with the goal of shaving off an extra 1 millisecond in 
transacting [45].  
It was in this context that the large fundamental 
trader initiated a sell program for the $4.1bn trade; 
this was executed automatically and thus an 
algorithm took the task to sell $4.1bn. In this case, 
the trader “chose to execute this sell program via a … 
‘Sell Algorithm’ that was programmed to feed orders 
… but without regard to price or time” [9, pp.2-3]. 
The algorithm only took volume into consideration. 
But while the initial problems were indeed created by 
the algorithm of the fundamental trader, they were 
then “amplified by the strategic behavior of the HFT 
[High-Frequency Trading]” [40, p.11]. HFT is yet 
another name for algorithmic trading or black-box 
trading. The consequences of the amplification of the 
Sell Algorithm by yet other algorithms created a 
dynamic exchange between technologies of the same 
type. Based on R3 this can be framed in the following 
general form: Technology A provides a stimulus for 
exciting technology B, and the output of B’s 
operation(s), as feedback and input to A, recursively 
shape the environment of technological subsystem A.  
One can conceptualize this situation through 
systems theorizing by means of considering 
alternative observing perspectives with which to 
explore the system/environment distinction (R5). 
First, if the Sell Algorithm executed by the large 
fundamental trader is considered from the perspective 
of technological subsystem A, then in its environment 
one can observe: a) the totality of all other automated 
execution algorithms (let’s call those Algo(1), 
Algo(2), ….Algo(n)), and b) the transaction outcomes 
from human traders (though as we saw in the 
introduction, the volume of their transactions is 
becoming more and more limited). Similarly, if we 
take the different observing perspective of another 
HFT, say Algo(2), which we define as our system, we 
would observe the Sell Algorithm in its environment, 
along with all other automated execution algorithms 
[Algo(1), Algo(3), …Algo(n)] and the human traders. 
Naturally, for fair competition reasons, the trading 
logic of any given Algo(n) is hidden from all other 
algorithms. Considering both of the mentioned 
observing perspectives in tandem at a meta-level (one 
that would be applicable for any automated 
execution), we have a system that is stimulated by the 
reactions it itself triggers upon its own environment.   
Indeed, while the sell pressure established by the 
“Sell Algorithm” was initially absorbed by High-
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Frequency Traders (HFT’s), - at about 2:44pm – 
HFT’s started to sell contracts aggressively.  Then, 
the “Sell Algorithm” used by the large trader 
responded to the increased volume by increasing the 
rate at which it was feeding the orders into the 
market, even though orders that it already sent to the 
market were arguably not yet fully absorbed” [9, 
p.3]. This type of self-reference (R4) can be portrayed 
as a “negative spiraling effect … (where)… HFT 
may have a destabilizing effect through its 
endogenous self-excitation nature within the (small) 
pool of participants” [40, p.11]. This unsupervised 
self-excitation of technology at the level of the 
financial market is based upon a coupling between 
technology and technology, a condition that relegates 
humans to the external environment of that system. 
This has both significant and specific implications.  
In the events that unfolded, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average plunged 998.5 points. This 
became known as the Flash Crash of 2:45 (and while 
the index recovered some moments later, it wiped out 
value from several companies). After five months of 
investigations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), along with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), attributed the 
decline to the automated execution of orders despite 
the fact that no specific reason/trigger/algorithm 
could be identified for the event. In fact, “the exact 
reason or reasons for the so-called flash crash remain 
obscured by the mechanics of the electronic trading 
systems that execute millions of buy-and-sell orders 
during the course of a single trading day. Some 
initially blamed the crash on a ‘fat finger,’ (meaning 
a big individual investor) while others contended that 
essentially unregulated electronic trading platforms 
were the culprit. Others even questioned whether 
terrorists or hackers were behind the dramatic drop” 
[6, pp.40-41].  
The difficulty in identifying a specific cause 
renders the very idea of cause-and-effect (itself a 
nonsystematic idea) problematic in this context; this 
constitutes an irony, considering that the repeatable 
operations of technology usually allow the 
identification/back-tracking of effects. Of course, 
without recursive feedback, technology as a system 
would not exhibit such ramifications in the first 
place. In this regard, what would otherwise be 
conceptualized as cause and effect is better 
conceptualized as a web of back-and-forth impacts 
distributed amongst the complex interactions within 
the broader system of technology. There is no “error” 
in the individual technologies themselves (i.e. the 
algorithms); no bug needs be rectified. Thus, non-
attribution of error to a single algorithm leads us to 
consider this as a systemic phenomenon that emerges 
out of the complex interaction of multiple automated 
execution technologies (R1).  
Of course, the flash crash would have been 
impossible at such a level without the complex 
interactions between algorithms. As the testimony of 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro confirmed to the US 
Congress: “automated trading systems will follow 
their coded logic regardless of outcome, while human 
involvement likely would have prevented these 
orders from executing at absurd prices” [37, p.7]. The 
unpredictability with which automated algorithms 
feed off each other creates emergent conditions that 
can destabilize any system that technology itself 
penetrates. For the financial system that serves such 
an important function within the broader system of 
society, the implications are clear: Market outcomes 
are guided by computerized decisions that are 
executed algorithmically. While individual 
algorithms may reflect the general intentions of their 
designers, the algorithms as a whole find themselves 
within a far more complex environment (that they 
themselves help to constitute and create). In such 
conditions, algorithms feed off each other and – 
within the demands for millisecond transacting and 
communication (R6) – create another version of the 
financial system where transacting decisions are 
executed in a technologized fashion; these lead to 
unpredictable consequences. Ultimately, this re-
arranges the roles of technology and humans.  
For example, while the chaotic behavior was 
continuing in the flash crash, another algorithm was 
triggered, known as the Stop Logic Functionality of 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). This was 
automatically executed in order to prevent any further 
price movements over an excessive range. By 
effectively pausing the market momentarily, this 
gives time to humans to recalibrate any parameters 
and re-launch the algorithms in the pit of algorithmic 
trading. The need to include Stop and Pause 
algorithms in order to contain any emergent 
uncertainties from the automated behavior of other 
buy/sell algorithms illustrates two things: first, how 
the “controllability” of technology is dependent on 
more technology, and, b) how restricted the role of 
human beings has become in the actual decision-
making process in the financial system. To a large 
degree, “People no longer are responsible for what 
happens in the market, because computers make all 
the decisions” [21, p.270]. Whatever intentionality is 
imbued within specific algorithms by its designers, 
this dissipates quickly. Humans are merely there to 
“recalibrate” the re-launch of algorithms so that the 
latter can be pitted against each other in millions of 
millisecond-transactions, the net result of which is 
unpredictable.  
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Of course, once the demand for algorithmic 
decisions is set firmly, further complications can be 
considered. For example, new “crash algorithms will 
likely be developed to trade during periods of market 
stresses in order to profit from these periods” [40, 
p.4]. Algorithms will also be developed that will 
attempt to exploit to the maximum the number of 
times they can offer/request something from the 
market. The patterns of some of these algorithms 
have been discovered on a few occasions, and what is 
rather astonishing is the speed with which orders may 
be placed. Below is a visualization of an algorithm 
(labeled the “Knife” by the company Nanex) where 
the algorithm transacts around 7 times every 60 
milliseconds; in the image below, the dotted vertical 
lines indicate the 60ms intervals while the whole 
duration represented in the image below is 1.6 
seconds. The analysis of the company on high-
frequency trading found “cases where one exchange 
was sending an extremely high number of quotes for 
one stock in a single second: as high as 5,000 quotes 
in 1 second!” That’s 5 quotes (for the same stock) 
every millisecond. As the company states: “Even 
more disturbing, there doesn’t seem to be any 
economic justification for this” [33].  
 
 
Figure 1: Visualization of algorithmic formations 
during trading (with kind permission from nanex.net)  
 
Also, one can consider here algorithms that are 
designed to find the digital footprints of each other. 
By considering such algorithms that collaborate in 
specific market conditions, we could see the 
emergence of unfair algorithmic competition; and 
indeed, with the increasing attention that has been 
given to information security and cybersecurity 
breaches [15], automated financial trading may 
become subject to hackers or terrorists that will seek 
to create financial instability deliberately (e.g. by 
deactivating/ modifying a stop algorithm). Whatever 
the destabilization effect, the speed of such 
transacting and the practical alienation of the human 
factor, relegated to the environment of the system of 
technology, can lead to an algorithmic war. To 
summarize, this involves algorithms that structure the 
market (by automated execution), anti-systemic 
algorithms that could destabilize the system (e.g. by 
creating complexity in automated transacting and 
generating a financial crisis or other destabilization 
phenomena), crash algorithms that may exploit 
financial instability for profit, as well as the 
algorithmic response of the regulators to the crisis 
(by stop/pause algorithms). Due to the intrinsic 
complexity and the multiple entities involved in these 
cases, no single entity (human or algorithm) can 
monitor all financial interactions taking place at any 
given point in time; this realizes the necessary 
conditions for a system that maintains and sustains 
itself via the function of automation: the system of 
technology.  
 
5. Discussion: from Artifact to System 
 
Despite our use of the Flash Crash incident, we 
are not making a value judgment whether algorithmic 
trading is good or a bad. Indeed, there are scholars 
arguing that – overall – high-frequency trading by 
algorithms may even be beneficial for market 
liquidity [2, 11, 19]. However, we would like to draw 
the attention of our readers to the fundamental 
imbalance in human/computer decision-making and 
highlight the interest that this poses for the field of 
IS. At a minimum, the conditions described above 
should allow us to reflect further on the transition 
from IT as an artifact (a tool shaped and used by 
humans to serve human ends) to IT as its own system 
(which in turn regards humans as tools for it to shape 
and use to suit the IT system’s own ends). In that 
condition, technology expresses itself through 
emergent phenomena and cannot be controlled in a 
causal way. Of course, this runs contrary to the 
design of technologies with a specified coded 
rationality.  
The logic with which any given technological 
artifact interacts with other technological artifacts 
also requires reconsideration. In circumstances like 
those we have described in the previous section for 
the flash crash, one cannot deny that there is a high 
degree of complexity (not even a prolonged 
investigation could identify the “causes” as these are 
distributed and not linked to single entities). But there 
is another reading of complexity that could illuminate 
an additional aspect. Luhmann defines complexity 
“as a measure of the incapacity of a system to relate 
each element to every other one, be it in the system 
itself (system complexity) or in its environment 
(environmental complexity). … Complexity means 
the necessity of selective relations and, since 
relations specify what elements are possible within 
the system, complexity also means contingent 
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elements. The analysis of complexity leads back to 
the notion of self-referential, self-organizing 
systems” [24, p.993].  Applied to the conditions that 
this view of complexity poses for technological 
interconnections, we can infer the following: different 
technological artifacts must succumb to a restriction 
of their individual coded rationalities as a 
precondition to interconnect. A very simple example 
of this is the following (this does not however capture 
the technologized complexity of more complex 
networks or entire function systems of society like 
the economic system): Suppose we have two different 
companies (A and B) that engage in algorithmic 
trading and both companies are the only two 
companies that want to sell/buy stock to/from another 
company X. We assume that A will not know what 
B’s strategy would be and vice versa. By 
participating in algorithmic trading, A wants to sell 
the stock of company X and has set an algorithmic 
parameter between $20 and $10 (we’re making the 
hypothesis here that price is the only criterion). 
Company B on the other hand has set an algorithmic 
parameter to buy the stock between $6 and $12. Both 
algorithms are executed so that their strategies are 
optimized (so the algorithm would first start 
exploring the sale of the stock at $20 before going 
down to $19.5, $19, and so on – one can inject here 
several other conditions like the time-frequency with 
which the drop would take place, the value of the 
drop in each step (say $0.10, $0.50, $1), etc). 
Similarly for B (starting from $6). But before even 
this process starts to take place for A and B, the 
subset of pre-coded rationalities, specifically the 
subset within the range between $12-$20 for A and 
$6-$10 for B, constitutes a non-existent set for an 
observer who would have visibility of both. The 
establishment of allowed relations between A and B 
as a prerequisite for inter-connecting, necessitates a 
restriction from the full spectrum of available 
possibilities for each one. Even in this simple 
example, seemingly well-defined thresholds that 
express pre-coded rationalities are facing restrictions 
based on their environment. The extent of 
unavoidable restrictions in element-interconnection 
cannot be anticipated by the designers of the original 
systems of A and B. Despite the strict controls that 
may be imposed by designers, an ensemble of 
artifacts can evolve additional systemic conditions. 
Then, if we consider more realistic assumptions 
like: a) dynamic ranges in price (say between $x and 
$y), which will not be fixed, or b) algorithms that 
take input from their (uncertain and dynamic) 
environments in order to “determine” that (temporary 
$x-$y) range, we can see how millions of transactions 
and millisecond-timeframes fuel systemic 
complexity. What is the role of designers in this 
case? What meaning does “controllability” acquire in 
the context of an “artifact?” Hence, the design of any 
technological artifact (such as an algorithm) with a 
specific coded rationality is simply the starting point 
through which that artifact will be allowed to partake 
in the complex nexus of algorithmic exchanges. 
Through those, all technologized trading algorithms 
“design” the market collectively and create an 
asymmetry between humans/technology; in those 
domains where technology has become more 
dominant in overtaking human decision-making, this 
implies a severe restriction of human agency, 
intentionality, participation, and decision-making. 
This shift that we describe does not only imply 
that “technologies create the ways in which people 
perceive reality” [35, p.21]. In taking decision 
making away from humans, technologized decision 
making within the context of a system of technology 
creates a reality that casts humans out to its 
environment. Alas, human decision-making is 
becoming more and more restricted in a 
support/“tool-like” role that allows for the 
continuation of complex and invisible (at the level of 
the system) technologized decision-making. In 
mutating from an artifact to a system, technology 
carves new boundaries in the distinction between 
humans and technology. This presents new 
challenges and opens up an important and novel 
domain for IS research, the consequences of which 
must be investigated further.  
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